UIC Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 2

2022

Coerced Testimony of a Witness, As Opposed to the Fabrication
of Evidence, Should Not Be Used as a Basis to Satisfy a § 1983
Claim for Alleged Due Process Violations in an Underlying
Criminal Matter, 55 UIC L. Rev. 40 (2022)
Jonathan Federman
Kyle Fleck

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Jonathan L. Federman & Kyle Fleck, Coerced Testimony of a Witness, As Opposed to the Fabrication of
Evidence, Should Not Be Used as a Basis to Satisfy a § 1983 Claim for Alleged Due Process Violations in
an Underlying Criminal Matter, 55 UIC L. Rev. 40 (2022)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

COERCED TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS, AS
OPPOSED TO THE FABRICATION OF
EVIDENCE, SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A
BASIS TO SATISFY A § 1983 CLAIM FOR
ALLEGED DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN
AN UNDERLYING CRIMINAL MATTER
JONATHAN L. FEDERMAN AND KYLE FLECK*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 40
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
AND § 1983 ........................................................................ 42
A. History of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .............................. 44
B. Testimonial Witness Immunity in § 1983 Claims ... 47
C. Absolute Immunity and Qualified Immunity .......... 48
III. WHETHER COERCED TESTIMONY OF A NON-DEFENDANT
WITNESS VIOLATES A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
........................................................................................... 51
A. A Plaintiff Must Have Standing to Recover for his or
her Claims .................................................................. 52
B. Coerced Testimony Versus Fabricated Evidence /
Testimony................................................................... 55
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach Distinguishes
Coerced Testimony from Fabricated Evidence
Claims .................................................................. 57
2. The Seventh’s Circuit Further Elaborated the
Distinction Between Coerced Testimony and
Fabricated Evidence in Petty v. City of Chicago 58
3. Other Jurisdictions Generally Fail to Recognize a
Distinction Between Coerced Testimony and
Fabricated Evidence Claims ............................... 62
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DISTINGUISHES
BETWEEN COERCED TESTIMONY AND FABRICATION OF
EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY AS THE ANALYSIS FALLS IN LINE
WITH ESTABLISHED LEGAL CONCEPTS .............................. 64
V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 67

I. INTRODUCTION
Due process requires establishing a set of rules to determine
admissible evidence.1 In a criminal trial, the trial judge acts as a
* Jonathan and Kyle would like to thank Justice Thomas Kilbride, ret., the
University of Illinois-Chicago School of Law, and their respective law firms,
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP and Nielsen, Zehe & Antas, P.C,
Jonathan further thanks Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, and Robert M.
Chemers.
1. See Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)
(explaining “[t]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
40
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“gatekeeper” for determining whether evidence proffered by the
prosecution, or the defense is relevant and therefore admissible. Of
course, these rulings are subject to the rules of evidence that govern
every state and federal court.2 The principal exception under these
rules (among the many) is that a “court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”3 Ultimately, these
evidentiary rulings set the contours for what evidence the jury will
review when rendering its verdict. Due Process requires certain
limitations as to what evidence is properly before a jury.
While acting as the first line of defense, the trial judge is often
not the final authority of whether evidence is accepted or
admissible. First, the jury has the duty to accept the admitted
evidence as true or false and to determine the weight given to each
piece thereof.4 Second, as a matter of law, parties to a criminal
matter may appeal the admissibility of evidence, whether admitted
or excluded, at the appellate level (up the highest Court in the land)
via a proper objection or an offer of proof, respectively.5 On appeal,
the higher courts review the trial judge’s evidentiary decision by
applying an “abuse of discretion” standard.6 This multitier system
is designed to protect against the admission of irrelevant or
prejudicial evidence and to ensure that proper evidence is not
wrongfully excluded.
Nevertheless, this is not a perfect process. Inevitably, our
criminal judicial system will render wrongful convictions based on
an improper acceptance or exclusion of evidence.7 In light of this
untenable yet inevitable result, the federal government enacted
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide an avenue for civil recourse to
those who were not afforded due process during their antecedent
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use
of evidence whether true or false”).
2. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 370, n.13 (2011) (noting that,
consistent with the federal and state rules of evidence, “the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to
admission of, for example, unreliable evidence”).
3. FED. R. EVID. 403.
4. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 680-81 (1975) (noting “[w]e must
hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty
of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court, and apply that law to
the facts as they find them to be from the evidence”).
5. Fed. R. Evid. 103.
6. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1984).
7. See Emily Haavik, ‘They didn’t let me be great’ Wrongfully Convicted
Minneapolis man spent nearly 6 years behind bars, KARE 11 (June 1, 2021),
www.kare11.com/article/syndication/podcasts/record-of-wrong/javon-davisminneapolis-wrongful-conviction/89-f251262d-0154-4084-9c6a-4fa463ce01af
[perma.cc/7RK3-CH2L] (identifying a specific individual spent six years in
prison after inadmissible evidence was introduced in his criminal trial).
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criminal trial.8 As such, § 1983 provides an individual the right to
sue state government employees and others acting “under color of
state law” for civil rights violations.9
The standards by which a § 1983 suit is administered are
different than those in the underlying criminal matter. Primarily, a
§ 1983 claim must be rooted in a violation or deprivation of a right
secured by federal, not state law.10 Thus, a review of the evidence
used to convict a then-defendant in a subsequent § 1983 claim is
adjudged by this same federal standard; not the state’s evidentiary
standard initially at issue in such cases.11
Under this purview, courts across the country differ on
whether the admission and use of coerced witness testimony at the
criminal level violate a defendant’s due process rights when
reviewed under the civil § 1983 standard. However, as this comment
will detail, the Seventh Circuit in Petty v. City of Chicago12 correctly
held that coerced witness testimony, as opposed to fabricated
evidence/testimony, does not grant a defendant the necessary
standing nor provide a cognizable due process claim required in a §
1983 suit.13 In short, and as explained in greater detail, infra,
coerced witness testimony does not invoke the defendant’s
constitutional rights as the violation (if any) is perpetrated against
the witness, not the defendant. Moreover, the veracity of coerced
witness testimony is an open question, subject to further
investigation. Meanwhile, fabricated evidence is patently false.
Therefore, a § 1983 plaintiff lacks standing to raise a claim for the
deprivation of due process if the only basis is that witness testimony
was spurned by alleged coercion.

II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND § 1983
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”14 Historically, courts
applied due process to “deliberate decisions of government officials
to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.”15 As an example, the
Due Process Clause is violated if a prosecutor knowingly uses
perjured testimony or deliberately suppresses evidence favorable to

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
9. Id.
10. See Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622 648, n.30 (1980) (noting
that federal causes of action are governed by federal law).
11. Id.
12. Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 422-23 (7th Cir. 2014).
13. Id. at 422.
14. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the accused.16 Thus, “[w]hen the quantum of proof supporting a
conviction falls sufficiently far below this standard, then the Due
Process Clause requires that the conviction be set aside, even in the
absence of any procedural error.”17 Understanding that not all due
process violations are discerned and rectified at their inception,
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.18

Given that due process claims historically required deliberate
acts or decisions on behalf of government officials to deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property, there was still an open question
as to whether negligent conduct was sufficient to constitute a due
process violation as well.19 In consideration of due process, “the
question is whether intent is required before there can be a
‘deprivation" of life, liberty, or property.’”20 “In Daniels, the United
States Supreme Court considered that very question.21 The Court
resoundingly rejected this argument.22 “Where a government
official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely
negligent, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally
required.”23 It has been noted that a ruling to the contrary would
trivialize the right of action provided by § 1983 as
[t]hat provision was enacted to deter real abuses by state officials in
the exercise of governmental powers. It would make no sense to open
the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative
abuse of power, merely a negligent deed by one who happens to be
acting under color of state law.24

Accordingly, there is a distinction between protectable legal
interests and those injuries protected by the United States

16. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 299 (1994).
17. Id. at 300 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
19. Daniels, 474 U.S at 329.
20. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981) (J. Powell concurring).
21. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
24. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 549 (J. Powell concurring).
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Constitution, such as governmental negligence, which could lead to
the creation of protectable legal interests.25 To that end, as the
Daniels Court recognized, States maintain the ability to enact tort
claims statutes to redress such injuries, but the United States
Constitution does address the same concerns as traditional tort
law.26 Therefore, and as will be discussed, infra, § 1983 is the vehicle
in which prior defendants-turned-litigants seek to civilly and
retroactively recover for intentional violations of the Due Process
Clause which may have occurred at their preceding criminal trial.

A. History of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (a.k.a. the “Ku Klux Klan Act.”)27 The necessity of
enacting § 1983 sprang from the fact that “[t]he very language of
the Fourteenth Amendment indicates Congress did not intend it to
be self-enforcing.”28 Consequently, without an activating force,
certain protections afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment
would lay dormant – a reality that was anathema during
Reconstruction.29 Accordingly, on March 28, 1871, Congressman
Samuel Shellabarger introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the
“Act”), as modeled after Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1886.30
The Act was initially enacted as a response to the widespread
violence spawned by racism which state courts and prosecutors in
the South had frankly been unmotivated to deter under state law.31
Accordingly, § 1983 became “one of the means whereby Congress
25. Id. at 333.
26. Id.
27. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 183 (1970).
28. Magana v. Northern Mariana Islands, 107 F.3d 1436, 1441 (9th Cir.
1997).
29. See Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994, 995 (1966) (describing that on
March 23, 1871, President Grant sent a message to Congress stating, “I urgently
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually
secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the
United States.”)
30. Nicholas Mosvick, Looking Back at the Ku Klux Klan Act, NAT’L CONST.
CTR.
(Apr.
20,
2021),
www.constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/blog/looking-back-at-the-ku-klux-klan-act [perma.cc/43D8-7U6X].
31. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 428 (stating that
[w]hile murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending American
citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or
unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the
night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could
devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime, and
the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence
of effective redress.)
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exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment.”32 As
Senator George Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, stated:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining
the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when they
are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and it
is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has
since become a part of the Constitution.33

Originally drafted in 1871, § 1983's predecessor protected
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,
however “the provision included by the Congress in the Revised
Statutes of 1874 was enlarged to provide protection for rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as well.”34 Still in
its infancy, § 1983’s protections were severely circumscribed
relative to its current reach.
It was not until 1961, in Monroe v. Pape, that § 1983 took its
first step towards becoming a tool to address and prevent abuses by
state officials.35 In Monroe, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in review of the judgment against Monroe in his
suit against police officers and city officials.36 The plaintiffs
contended that the invasion of his home, subsequent search without
a warrant, and arrest and detention without a warrant and without
arraignment constituted a deprivation of their rights, privileges,
and immunities secured by the Constitution within the meaning of
42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.37
In his subsequent § 1983 suit, Monroe alleged that these police
officers acted “under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs and usages” of Illinois and the City of Chicago.38 The Court
initially noted that “[t]here can be no doubt . . . that Congress has
the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and
represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with
their authority or misuse it.”39 However, the Court went on to
grapple with the narrower issue of whether, by enacting § 1983,
Congress intended to provide a remedy to individuals deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official’s

32. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (overruled on other grounds).
33. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 80, 83-85.
34. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244, n.30 (1972).
35. See generally Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 (noting that the narrow question
that the Court considered is a narrow one as to whether in exacting § 1983,
Congress “meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights,
privileges, and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position”).
36. Id. at 168-69.
37. Id. at 169.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 171-72.
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abuse of his or her position.40
In reviewing § 1983, the Court held that “[i]t is no answer that
the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”41
In defining what “under of color” of state law meant, the Court
turned to its decision in United States v. Classic, where Justice
Stone held: “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”42
However, even with this guiding principle, the Court determined
that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations
within the ambit of § 1983.43 Accordingly, the Court was not of the
opinion that the word “person” was intended to include
municipalities, and therefore the complaint against the City of
Chicago was dismissed.44 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
complaint should not have been dismissed against the officials and
reversed the judgment.45
Since Monroe, however, § 1983 has enjoyed an expansion of the
entities covered by its protections. A key piece in this evolution was
decided in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, when the United States
Supreme Court overruled its decision in Monroe by finding that
municipalities and other local governmental units were persons
who could, in fact, be sued under § 1983.46 Accordingly, “[l]ocal
governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.”47 Moreover, these local
governing bodies may also be sued “for constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a
custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
40. Id. at 172.
41. Id. at 183.
42. Id. at 184 (quoting U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
43. Id. at 187 (“[T]he House had solemnly decided that in their judgment
Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and
town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of state
law”).
44. Id. at 192.
45. Id.
46. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). It is also
important to note that, while this decision held that municipalities could be held
liable for the deprivation of constitutional rights, it clarified that § 1983 did not
“impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Id. at 692.
Rather, “Congress did specifically provide that A’s tort became B’s liability if B
‘caused’ A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend §
1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent.” Id.
47. Id. at 690.
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decision making channels.”48 In other words, a prima facie case for
a § 1983 claim is established if a plaintiff can show that a statebased governing body implemented an actual or implied policy that
deprived an individual of their constitutional rights.

B. Testimonial Witness Immunity in § 1983 Claims
The decision in Monell has provided the foundation for a litany
of litigation averred against municipalities for alleged violations of
an individual’s constitutional rights. Within this area of
jurisprudence lies a specific subset of § 1983 claims involving
witness testimony provided in an underlying criminal trial as a
factor in determining whether the then-defendant was deprived of
his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to a fair trial.
Fittingly, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
whether allegations that a police officer gave false testimony were
sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.49 There, the Court held two
reasons exist as to why § 1983 does not allow recovery of damages
against a private party or police officers for testimony in a judicial
proceeding. “First, § 1983 does not create a remedy for all conduct
that may result in violation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.’”50 “Second, since 1951, . . . it
has been settled that the all-encompassing language of § 1983,
referring to ‘[every] person’ who, under color of law, deprives
another of federal constitutional or statutory rights, is not to be
taken literally.”51 Thus, the tort liability afforded by § 1983 claims
must be viewed in a light that does not presuppose that the statute
was enacted to supplant “defenses previously recognized in ordinary
tort litigation . . . absent specific provisions to the contrary.”52
Accordingly, “with respect to private witnesses, it is clear that §
1983 did not abrogate the absolute immunity existing at common
law.”53
In quoting a 19th Century opinion, Justice Stevens echoed:
“[T]he claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public
policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the
ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as
possible.”54 By reinforcing a private witness’s immunity in a
subsequent § 1983 claim, the Court aimed to avoid a situation

48. Id. at 690-91; see also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 168 (finding that “because of
the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials . . . such
practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law).
49. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 327 (1983).
50. Id. at 329.
51. Id. at 330 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
52. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330.
53. Id. at 334.
54. Id. at 333 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)).
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wherein “[a] witness . . . might be inclined to shade his testimony
in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus
to deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted
evidence.”55
The Court then went on to apply this immunity to police officer
witnesses as well.56 In doing so, the Court first recognized that
“[t]here is, of course, the possibility that, despite the truth-finding
safeguards of the judicial process, some defendants might indeed be
unjustly convicted on the basis of knowingly false testimony by
police officers.”57 However, “in the end [it is] better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”58

C. Absolute Immunity and Qualified Immunity
The United States Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of
immunities under § 1983.59 Most public officials may be entitled
only to qualified immunity.60 Under qualified immunity,
“government officials are not subject to damages liability for the
performance of their discretionary functions when ‘their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”61
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that
certain officials perform “special functions” which deserve absolute
protection from damages liability.62 A public official seeking
absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity
is justified for the function in question.63 The United States
Supreme Court admits that it is “quite sparing” in recognizing
absolute immunity for state actors in the context of § 1983 claims.64
Courts have considered whether police and/or prosecutors are
entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for allegations of coerced
testimony or falsification or fabrication of evidence. In these
considerations, courts have generally found that police and/or
prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for such claims.65
55. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333 (citing Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity
in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 470 (1909)).
56. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345.
57. Id.
58. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
59. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993).
60. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
61. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
62. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69.
63. Id. (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1939)); Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, n.4 (1993)).
64. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269.
65. See Wearry v. Perrilloux, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111142, *5 (MD LA,
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In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
whether prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity for a claim
that they conspired to manufacture false evidence against a
criminal defendant.66 While a prosecutor may have absolute
immunity as to his or her role as an advocate for the State, which
may include out-of-court efforts to control the presentation of a
witness’s testimony, a “prosecutor’s administrative duties and those
investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial
proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.”67 The Court
recognized that the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely
immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor, as
qualified immunity represents the norm.68 Specifically, the Court
identified:
There is a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating
evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the
one hand, and the detective’s role in searching for the clues and
corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that
a suspect be arrested, on the other hand.69

The Court added that, when “a prosecutor performs the
investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police
officer, it is ‘neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same
act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.’”70
Ultimately, the Court held that that the prosecutors did not meet
their burden and were not entitled to absolute immunity as to
claims of fabrication of evidence during the investigation of a
crime.71
In Wearry, the Court held that a prosecutor was acting as an
advocate rather than an investigator when he allegedly coerced a
witness to implicate a defendant in a murder charge and coached
the witness on how to testify.72 The Court noted that, “nothing in
the willful fabrication of witness testimony is so essential to the
judicial process that a prosecutor or law enforcement officer should
be granted absolute immunity when he engages in it.”73 The Court
further added that “[t]he judicial process is a search for truth.
June 24, 2020) (applying Fifth Circuit precedent, absolute immunity not proper
for allegations of coerced testimony); see also Watkins v. Healy, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 134950, *27 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2019) (finding no absolute immunity
for prosecutor alleged to have coerced a witness into testifying against a
defendant); and see also Bledsoe v. Vanderbilt, 934 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.
2019) (holding no absolute immunity for prosecutor).
66. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272.
67. Id. at 273.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
71. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276.
72. Wearry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111142 *7.
73. Id. at *19.
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Coercion of untruthful testimony is not essential to the judicial
process; it is the antithesis of the judicial process.”74
Under this purview, the threshold question as to if a
governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity revolves
around whether that official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.75 While certain limitations on absolute immunity are
detailed above, the official may still be entitled to qualified
immunity if the right was not clearly established at the time of the
underlying event.76 “Government officials performing discretionary
functions are generally protected from civil damages liability as
long as their ‘conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have
known.’” 77
Further, courts generally agree that police officers and/or
prosecutors are not entitled to qualified immunity for claims of
fabrication of evidence as the fabrication of evidence is not
something the Fourteenth Amendment tolerates.78 This is because
it is firmly established that there exists a constitutional right not to
be deprived of liberty on the basis of false evidence fabricated by a
police officer or prosecutor.79
Thus, while absolute immunity and qualified immunity may
play a role depending on the specific allegations of a former criminal
defendant, a criminal defendant may be able to assert allegations
sufficient to remove either of the immunities depending on the
specific violation(s) at issue.

74. Id.; but see Beckett v. Ford, 384 F.App’x 435, 449-50 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for allegedly
coercing an individual to falsely implicate the plaintiff in a murder investigation
by pressuring, threatening, and enticing witnesses to lie, present false
testimony, failure to disclose a deal the prosecutor and a police officer made
with a witness, and conspired with a police officer to frame the plaintiff for
murder).
75. Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (W.D. Va., June 23,
2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
76. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (citing Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543,
549 (4th Cir. 2002)).
77. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
78. See Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding
no qualified immunity for police officer accused of fabricating evidence, citing
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) as the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false
evidence); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) (“it is firmly
established that a constitutional right exists not to be deprived of liberty on the
basis of false evidence fabricated by a government officer”); Truman v. Orem
City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1241 (10th Cir. 2021) (“any reasonable prosecutor
understand that providing a medical examiner fabricated evidence and then
putting him on the stand to testify based on that false information offends the
Constitution”); Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Fields
II”) (ruling there is no qualified immunity for fabrication of evidence).
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
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III. WHETHER COERCED TESTIMONY OF A NONDEFENDANT WITNESS VIOLATES A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL
While Briscoe held that private parties and police officers were
immune from § 1983 liability for testimony given at a criminal trial,
the question remained as to whether these same officers were
subject to § 1983 when they coerced a witness to give testimony that
was ultimately proven false.80
Of course, Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny have preserved
the protections against self-incriminating testimony that is the
result of coercion and compulsion as rights guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.81 However, the precedents set in
those cases are mostly inapplicable when determining if a criminal
defendant’s due process rights are violated under § 1983 when a
non-defendant witness provides testimony that was the product of
police and/or prosecutorial coercion. Without guidance from the
United States Supreme Court, this issue has become muddied by
differing and/or non-existent rulings on this fundamental aspect of
any § 1983 claim predicated on the validity of the testimony used at
the underlying criminal trial,82
For example, in United States v. Mattison, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that because the witness’s testimony — as opposed to earlier
statements the witness made prior to trial — was not the product of
coercion, the testimony was properly allowed.83 However, this left
the door open for the proposition that if a witness’s testimony was
the product of coercion, then the defendant’s Due Process rights
may be violated. To date, the issue remains as to whether a criminal
defendant has a cognizable § 1983 claim when the prosecution relies
upon a third-party witness’s testimony coerced by law enforcement
officials.
At the center of this matter lies two issues: (1) whether a
former criminal defendant has standing to bring suit for ancillary
80. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 346-47.
81. See 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (holding that unless compulsion inherent
in custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free
choice); see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (holding that
“[t]estimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence
of coerced testimony”).
82. Trammell v. Ducart, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96334, *27 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
83. United States v. Mattison, 437 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1970) (affirming the
allowance of the testimony because
[n]one of the witness statements obtained at his illegal interrogation
were introduced at trial, by the time of trial, the coercive atmosphere of
the interrogation was dissipated, the witness was not told what to say on
the stand, and his identification of defendant was made in open court,
subject to cross-examination, where the jury observed his demeanor and
gauged his credibility
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coercive acts taken against a testifying third-party witness; and (2)
how the potential truthfulness of coerced testimony as compared to
fabricated evidence should factor into whether the then-defendant’s
due process rights were in fact violated. Each is taken in turn below.

A. A Plaintiff Must Have Standing to Recover for his or
her Claims
To understand what standing a plaintiff must possess when
bringing a § 1983 suit, it is first necessary to understand how
coercion can trigger an individual’s due process rights. To that end,
coercion jurisprudence finds its origins in an individual’s right
against being compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against him or herself.84 Inherent in the application of this
fundamental tenet is a right, personal in nature, that affords
protection against governmental coercion and compulsion in the
pursuit of self-incrimination.85 Nevertheless, “confessions remain a
proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and
voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course,
admissible in evidence.”86 However, as confessions may serve as the
most incriminating form of evidence available to the prosecution,
“[t]he realization of the convincing quality of a confession tempts
officials to press suspects unduly for such statements.”87 Such
temptations have led to the application of intolerable, even
dehumanizing, tactics in the pursuit of such damning evidence.88
In response, fundamental constitutional constructs have
been designed and enforced to ensure that the corrosive effects of a
confession derived from coercion are not heard at trial.89
84. U.S. CONST., amend. V (emphasis added).
85. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 202 (1998) (“[F]or an accused's
communication to be protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, it is not enough that the compelled communication is sought for
its content--instead, the content itself must have testimonial significance
86. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478).
87. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 348 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (prolonged isolation
from family or friends in a hostile setting); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962) (creating a desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted
suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation end); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949) (being interrogated for days on end while being held in
solitary confinement in a cell called “the hole” without being afforded a prompt
preliminary hearing).
89. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985)
[a]sking whether the confession was ‘involuntary,’ Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), the Court’s analysis has consistently
been animated by the view that ‘ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system,’ Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961), and
that, accordingly, tactics for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall
within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth
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Accordingly, coercion — whether physical or mental — is forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment when it is the conduit through which
a confession is secured.90 However, while certain methods of
securing confessions against one’s self have been necessarily rooted
out, the distinction between coerced self-incrimination and coerced
witness testimony is one with a significant difference. Whereas, in
the former, the constitutional violation is being directly imposed
upon the defendant thereby guaranteeing him standing against the
alleged coercive conduct.91 The same is not true in the latter as it is
in-fact, the witness’s individual rights (if anyone’s), and not the
defendant’s rights, that may have been violated.92 Herein lies the
crux of the issue as a party generally may only seek redress for
injuries done to him or her but may not seek redress for injuries
done to others.93 Therefore, it has been held that this degree of
separation, in general, fails to invoke the concomitant federal
violation necessary to trigger a § 1983 suit since a party without
standing may not seek redress for a constitutional deprivation.94
More specifically, here, while this issue remains unresolved by the
Supreme Court, a circuit split exists as to whether a plaintiff may
assert a § 1983 claim for coercion when the specific coercive acts
were conducted towards a third party, not the defendant.95
On the more permissive side of this issue, at least one
jurisdiction has held that a violation of a criminal defendant’s due
process rights exists when a witness is coerced to provide
adversarial testimony. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly
held that the use of another person’s coerced testimony may violate
a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.96 This position was also held by the
Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness
90. Levra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954).
91. See Buckley, 20 F.3d. at 794 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that coercing
witnesses to speak is a genuine constitutional wrong in which the aggrieved
party is the witness, not the defendant).
92. Id.
93. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972); see also Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828-29 (1974) (holding a person cannot “acquire
standing to sue by bringing his action on behalf of others who suffered injury
which would have afforded them standing had they been named plaintiffs; its
bears repeating that a person cannot predicate standing on injury which he does
not share”).
94. See Collins v. W. Hartford Police Dep’t, 324 F. App’x 137, 139 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that the plaintiff could not establish a right to relief under § 1983
because he lacked standing as he failed to allege a cognizable deprivation of his
liberty or property and had no standing to challenge constitutional deprivations
alleged to have been experienced by his mother).
95. White v. McQuiggin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137279, *19 (E. D. Mich.
Nov. 30, 2011) (“The Supreme Court had not yet decided whether the admission
of a coerced third-party statement against a criminal defendant is
unconstitutional”).
96. Bradford v. Johnson, 476 F.2d 66, 66 (6th Cir. 1973); White v.
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Kansas Court of Appeals.97
Other courts have held that a criminal defendant’s rights are
violated by coercive tactics directed towards separate individuals.
In United States v. Gonzales, a case that did not involve a § 1983
claim, the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether it was proper to allow
the defendants to challenge the voluntariness of the subject
witness’s testimony.98 There, the court held that while a defendant’s
rights are not violated when the police use coercive tactics to
procure testimony from a witness, “the defendants’ due process
rights would be implicated if the subject witness was coerced into
making false statements and those statements were admitted
against defendants at trial.”99 Additionally, the Supreme Court of
Kansas has affirmed the decision in Shumway in holding that “a
conviction based, in whole or in part, on a witness’ coerced
statement may deprive the defendant of due process.”100 As was the
case in Gonzales, such rights are implicated if the testimony was
actually coerced, and the testimony was introduced at trial.101
However, the rationales buttressing these decisions do not take
into consideration the totality of the issue as the Seventh Circuit
did previously. In Petty v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that, while “obtaining a statement with coercive tactics
that inculpated the arrestee may have violated the witness’s rights,”
it does not, at the same time “violate the arrestee’s due process
rights.”102 Moreover, “[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying
witnesses for testimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable,
and these tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they
do not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even when
their fruits are introduced at trial.”103 The primary reason for this
holding was that “[e]vidence collected with these kinds of suspect
[coercive] techniques, unlike falsified evidence and perjured
testimony, may turn out to be true.”104 Accordingly, under Petty,
witness trial testimony elicited by governmental coercion does not
violate a defendant’s due process rights such that it would invoke a

McQuiggin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137279, *18 (E.D. Mich., Nov. 30, 2011)
(citing Bradford, 476 F.2d at 66).
97. State v. Shumway, 30 Kan. App. 2d 836, 841 (2002) (citing United States
v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, although a
defendant's rights are not directly implicated by police coercion of a witness'
statements, the defendant’s right to due process is implicated by admission of
false statements involuntarily elicited from the witness).
98. United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 1289 (citing Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794-95); Clanton v. Cooper, 129
F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1997)).
100. State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 630 (2014).
101. Id.
102. 754 F.3d 416, 422 (2014) (citing Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794).
103. Petty, 754 F.3d at 422 (quoting Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567,
584 (7th Cir. 2012)).
104. Petty, 754 F.3d at 422.
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federal basis to substantiate a § 1983 claim.105

B. Coerced Testimony Versus Fabricated Evidence /
Testimony
The law considers coercion in both the civil and criminal
context. Though this comment focuses on coerced testimony in a
civil action, brought as a claim pursuant to § 1983, the issue
necessarily arises out of a criminal trial in which police and/or
prosecutors allegedly engaged in coercing witness testimony
against the criminal defendant.106 The question that this comment
addresses is whether coerced testimony has a legal distinction
separate and apart from fabricated evidence to support that the two
concepts should be treated differently in the context of a § 1983
claim.
Coercion requests a court to “weigh the circumstances of
pressure against the power of resistance of the person
confessing.”107 “Coerced testimony is testimony that a witness is
forced by improper means to give; the testimony may be true or
false.”108 A court can only determine whether a confession was
coerced by reviewing the circumstances surrounding the
confessions.109 Thus, coercion is determined from the perspective of
the suspect.110 “Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false
sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or
coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.”111 As such,
the issue of ‘voluntariness’ “is a legal question requiring
independent federal determination.”112
Conversely, a “police officer who manufactures false evidence
against a criminal defendant violates due process if that evidence is
later used to deprive the defendant of his liberty in some way.”113 A
plaintiff must demonstrate that the police officers created evidence
that they knew to be false, and the evidence must also have been

105. Id.
106. See generally Owen, 445 U.S. at 651 (noting that § 1983 “was intended
not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as
a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well”).
107. Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958) (citing Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957)).
108. Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1110; Lopez v. City of N.Y., 105 F.Supp.3d 242,
248 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
109. Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1110.
110. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
111. Id. at 297.
112. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (citing Miller, 474 U.S.
at 110 ); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Davis v. North Carolina,
384 U.S. 747, 741-42 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1940).
113. Anderson v. City of Rockford, 932 F.3d 494, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing
Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580).
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used in some way to deprive the plaintiff of liberty.114 Further,
“[f]abricated testimony is testimony that is made up; it is invariably
false.”115 The Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state
criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.116
Accordingly, a prosecutor that deliberately misrepresents the truth
by using false evidence violates the defendant’s rights and the
evidence is, therefore, not constitutionally valid.117 Put simply,
fabricated evidence is a constitutional violation.118 In furtherance of
this principle, in Napue v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court
specifically held that the government may not knowingly use false
testimony to obtain a conviction.119
A critical factor as to how coercion should be differentiated
from fabricated evidence is how the two inherently involve
fundamentally different principles. As will be detailed, infra,
outside of the Seventh Circuit, courts generally do not explicitly
recognize the distinction between coerced testimony and
falsification or fabrication of evidence.120 Rather, those courts treat
allegations of coerced testimony as synonymous with allegations of
fabricated evidence.121 Yet, within the Seventh Circuit, courts
explicitly distinguish between coerced testimony and falsification or
fabrication of evidence on the grounds that the former may be true
while the latter is invariably false. This approach takes further
recognition of the fact that not all societal ills are remedied by the
United States Constitution, as some are instead considered under
other areas of law. Ultimately, the distinction between approaches
and recognition of the fundamental differences between the two
types of evidence may create a split in the circuits as the Seventh
Circuit will not find a valid § 1983 claim built solely on coerced
testimony while other jurisdictions appear poised to permit such a
claim to go forward.

114. Anderson, 932 F.3d at 510 (citing Petty, 754 F.3d at 423); Whitlock, 682
F.3d at 580.
115. Anderson, 932 F.3d at 510.
116. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935)).
117. Miller, 386 U.S. at 7.
118. Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 582.
119. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959).
120. The exception appears to be Lopez v. City of N.Y., where the Court did
explicitly recognize the distinction. 105 F.Supp.3d 242, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
121. See Wearry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111142, *19 (M.D. LA, June 24,
2020) (finding that absolute immunity would not be warranted under the facts
of the case because nothing in the willful fabrication of witness testimony was
so essential to the judicial process that a prosecutor or law enforcement officer
should be granted absolute immunity when he engaged in it).
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach Distinguishes Coerced
Testimony from Fabricated Evidence Claims
In Whitlock v. Brueggemann, the Seventh Circuit reviewed
whether the alleged usage of coerced testimony in a wrongful
murder conviction violated the then-defendants’ due process
rights.122 In ruling on this issue, the court held that “[c]oercively
interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for testimony, and
witness-shopping may be deplorable, and these tactics may
contribute to wrongful convictions, but they do not necessarily add
up to a constitutional violation even when their fruits are
introduced at trial.”123 Because “[e]vidence collected with these
kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsified evidence and perjured
testimony, may turn out to be true[,]” the court did not extend §
1983 coverage in this instance 124.
Next, in Field v. Wharrie (“Fields II”), the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a similar § 1983 suit wherein the plaintiff, Fields, also
claimed that his due process rights were violated when the police
and prosecution allegedly used coercion to elicit false testimony to
implicate him in a double murder.125 In Fields v. Wharrie (“Fields
I”), the defendant was wrongfully convicted of two murders.126
Twenty-five years after the ordeal started, the defendant was
exonerated, and he brought claims against, amongst others,
Assistant State Attorneys, alleging that they induced false
testimony during both his trial and subsequent retrial.127 The
defendant claimed that police officers and an assistant state
attorney solicited false testimony against him from a fellow gang
member.128 The witness testified and received a no prosecution

122. 682 F.3d 567, 580 (2012). In Whitlock, two individuals were convicted
of murders and spent twenty-one and seventeen years in prison, respectively,
before each was able to get their convictions reversed. Id. at 570. The
individuals then filed suit against a variety of state officials asserting violations
of their constitutional rights. Id. The investigating police officers of the murders
relied on a person who claimed he was present during the murders, and, at a
subsequent meeting, the witness identified the two individuals who were
ultimately found guilty. Id. at 571-72. The investigators put the witness in
seclusion, supplied him with money and alcohol, and, allegedly, fed him details
about the crimes. Id. at 572. The plaintiffs further alleged that the investigators
coerced a separate woman, with a known history of mental illness and drug
abuse, to provide information about the murders. Both witnesses testified at
trial. Id. The witnesses’ testimony and credibility were the sine qua non of the
State’s case. Id. Years later, different Illinois State Police officers reviewed the
case and concluded that the witnesses’ trial testimony was false, and that the
criminal defendants were innocent. Id.
123. Id. at 584.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Fields v. Wharrie,740 F.3d 1107, 1109 (2014).
126. 672 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 509.
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agreement in exchange for his testimony.129 Finally, the witness
ultimately confessed that his testimony was false.130
Following the confession, Fields filed for post-conviction relief
and ultimately received a new trial on separate evidence that a codefendant had bribed the initial trial judge.131 Fields was acquitted,
and he received a certificate of innocence.132 The defendant claimed
that he was deprived of due process through suggestive
identification procedures, deliberately suppressed exculpatory
evidence, suborning perjury, and witnesses coerced to provide false
evidence.133
In reviewing this claim in Fields II, the court first noted that
Fields used the terms “coerced,” “fabricated,” and “false testimony”
interchangeably to substantiate his civil claim.134 The Seventh
Circuit discussed how, while similar in nature, the definition of
these terms — in particular how the application of each affected the
credibility of the prosecution — constituted non-pedantic
distinctions as “they mean three different things.”135 Specifically,
“[c]oerced testimony is testimony that a witness is forced by
improper means to give.”136 Therefore, “the testimony may be true
or false.”137 Conversely, “[f]abricated testimony is testimony that is
made up; it is invariably false.”138 In other words, false testimony
“is testimony known to be untrue by the witness and by whoever
cajoled or coerced the witness to give it.”139 In drawing the
distinction between the two, the court held that while “[m]uch
testimony is inaccurate,” if it is “not deliberately so . . . [it is] not
false or fabricated as we are using these words.” 140 Ultimately, the
court held that the prosecutor was unable establish absolute
immunity as the evidence demonstrated that fabrication of evidence
occurred at the underlying trial.141
2. The Seventh’s Circuit Further Elaborated the Distinction
Between Coerced Testimony and Fabricated Evidence in
Petty v. City of Chicago
The Seventh Circuit echoed these same distinguishing factors

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1110.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1110.
140. Id. (alteration in original).
141. Id. at 1114.
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and expanded upon them in Petty.142 In Petty, following a murder,
police officers brought in witnesses for questioning.143 The police
questioned the witnesses between thirteen to seventeen hours
when one of the witnesses identified Petty.144 Petty was arrested on
an outstanding warrant, and the other witness then positively
identified Petty, leading to murder charges.145 During the criminal
trial, Petty filed a motion to suppress one of the witnesses
identification testimony, alleging that the witness only made the
initial false identification because the police told him who to pick.146
The witness claimed that police threatened to have his parole
revoked if he did not help convict Petty.147
The judge denied Petty’s motion, finding that the witness
identified Petty to the police and that the police acted in good
faith.148 After a bench trial, Petty was found not guilty, at which
point he filed a § 1983 claim.149 Petty claimed that the City was
liable under the Monell standard.150 The City moved to dismiss,
claiming that Petty did not suffer a constitutional violation because
he was not the person detained, and, therefore, he could not
establish a direct connection between the City’s alleged policy of
detaining people believed to be witnesses to crimes for extended
periods of time against their will and his alleged injury.151
Petty also alleged that individual police officers violated his
due process right to a fair trial by inducing prosecutors to
wrongfully prosecute him and deprived him of exculpatory
information in violation of Brady v. Maryland.152 The court noted
that Petty’s allegations were concerning and required close scrutiny
of police tactics, but the record did not reveal that his due process
rights were violated.153
Specifically,, the court reiterated the Fields II standard such
that “[i]n fabrication cases, the police or prosecutor manufactures
evidence that he knows to be false.”154 However, “a prosecutor
fabricating evidence that she knows to be false is different than
getting ‘a reluctant witness to say what may be true.’”155 Thus,
Petty’s § 1983 claim failed because “his claim is a ‘coercion’ case for
which there is no cognizable due process claim, as opposed to an

142. Petty, 754 F.3d at 416.
143. Id. at 418.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 419.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963); Petty, 754 F.3d at 419.
153. Petty, 754 F.3d at 421.
154. Id. at 422.
155. Id. (quoting Fields II, 740 F.3d at 1112).
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‘evidence fabrication’ case where there is a cognizable claim.”156 This
was despite the fact that Petty alleged:
CPD officers coerced [the witness] into giving false evidence by
threatening him with jail time if he did not cooperate, holding him
against his will in a locked room without food or water for over 13
hours, badgering him, and pressuring him to identify Petty as one of
the assailants.157

Rather, the court focused on the fact that this was different
than alleging that CPD officers created evidence that they knew to
be false, i.e., the hallmark of a fabrication case.158 To that end,
Petty’s complaint which used terms and phrases such as
“manufactured false evidence” and “false identification” was not
sufficient because, “when one closely examines the evidence, it is
clear that his case is a coercion case.”159 Accordingly, the terms
“‘[m]anufactured false evidence’ and ‘false identification’ are not
magic talismans that will transform a coercion case into an evidence
fabrication case and give rise to a cognizable claim where one does
not exist.”160 Therefore, Petty’s claim failed because he never alleged
that CPD officers manufactured evidence that they knew to be
false.161
Importantly, the discerning traits between coerced testimony
and fabricated testimony were critical in the analysis of whether
Petty’s due process rights were violated via the violation of witness’s
rights to be free from coercion when testifying.162 The court clarified
that while “[c]oercing witnesses to speak . . . is a genuine
constitutional wrong, the persons aggrieved [are the witnesses]
rather than [the arrestee].”163 Accordingly, “obtaining a statement
with coercive tactics that inculpated the arrestee may have violated
the witness’s rights, but it did not violate the arrestee’s due process
rights.”164 Therefore, the mere fact that a constitutional wrong was
committed against the witness was insufficient to substantiate a
defendant’s § 1983 claim.165
After Petty, the Seventh Circuit continued elaborating on the
distinction between coercion and fabrication of evidence. In
Anderson v. City of Rockford, the plaintiffs’ primary contention was
that the police officer defendants coerced two witnesses to give
statements implicating the plaintiffs that the defendants knew to

156. Petty, 754 F.3d at 422-23.
157. Id. at 423.
158. Id.
159. Id. (alteration in original).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 422.
163. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794).
164. Petty, 754 F.3d at 422.
165. Id.
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be false.166 The plaintiffs alleged that detectives secured a false
statement by threatening one witness with jail time if he failed to
cooperate, and detained that witness for more than ten hours.167
The plaintiffs further contended that the officers coerced a different
witness into falsely implicating the plaintiffs through physical force,
and by threatening the witness with additional charges if he failed
to cooperate.168 The plaintiffs further alleged that one of the
detectives instructed both witnesses to testify consistently with
their statements, even though he knew those statements were
false.169
The court identified that coercion and fabrication are not
synonyms.170 The court repeated that an allegation that a police
officer coerced a witness to give incriminating evidence does not,
standing alone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due process
rights.171 Noting that coerced testimony, forced by improper means
to give, may be true or false, while fabricated testimony is
invariably false, the court repeated its position that only fabricated
testimony supports a due process claim.172 The court identified that
claims of fabrication only support a due process violation if the
record shows that the officers created evidence that they knew was
false.173 The court held that were was more than mere coercion as
to one of the detectives, who admitted he knew that the witness’
statements were false, and nonetheless instructed them to testify
consistently with their false statements at the criminal defendants’
trials.174
The Seventh Circuit also held that police officers’ nondisclosure
of coercive acts used to obtain incriminating evidence from people
other than the criminal defendant sounds in malicious prosecution
rather than a due process claim.175 Thus, while a criminal defendant
may have a malicious prosecution claim, there is not necessarily a
due process claim.176 Such a result is consistent with established
United States Supreme Court precedent, which recognizes that
torts serve a different purpose from constitutional violations.177
166. Anderson, 932 F.3d at 510.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Avery, 847 F.3d at 439).
172. Anderson, 932 F.3d at 510.
173. Id. (citing Avery, 847 F.3d at 439, and Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584).
174. Anderson, 932 F.3d at 511.
175. Phillips v. City of Chicago, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39753 *77 (N.D. Ill.
2018) (internal citation omitted).
176. See Taylor v. City of Chicago, 80 F. Supp. 817, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(recognizing that due process claims based upon alleged coercion of codefendants and a separate witness are actually malicious prosecution claims
and the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s due process claims based on alleged
coercion).
177. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (finding that due process claims require
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However, the availability of a state-law remedy for malicious
prosecution does not defeat a federal due process claim against an
officer who fabricates evidence that is later used to obtain a
wrongful conviction.178
The Seventh Circuit clearly treats coerced testimony
separately and as distinct from fabricated evidence. The Seventh
Circuit specifically acknowledged that coerced testimony may or
may not be true, while fabricated evidence is always false. The
distinction is relevant, as a plaintiff may not have a valid § 1983
claim for allegations of coercion, while that plaintiff may have a
valid § 1983 claim for allegations of fabricated evidence. As the prior
cases demonstrate, the Seventh Circuit will permit claims of
coercion in which the officer or prosecutor knew or reasonably
should have known that the coerced testimony is false.179 The
Seventh Circuit’s approach also considers that a plaintiff may not
have standing to assert a § 1983 claim for conduct directly related
to third parties.180 That said, however, this approach recognizes
that there are more suitable causes of action to pursue such
remedies.181
3. Other Jurisdictions Generally Fail to Recognize a
Distinction Between Coerced Testimony and Fabricated
Evidence Claims
Outside of the Seventh Circuit, jurisdictions do not generally
consider the distinction between coerced testimony and fabricated
evidence. These jurisdictions generally lump coerced testimony in
with fabricated testimony, ignoring the subtle, yet real, distinction:
coerced testimony may be true and is not invariably false.
In Villegas v. City of El Paso, the District Court for the Western
District of Texas considered coercion and fabrication of evidence
issues.182 The court noted that “[o]fficers violate a criminal
defendant’s right when they pressure a specific witness through
specific threats targeted to secure the conviction of an individual
defendant.”183 The court held that such conduct violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.184 The court, however, did not analyze the

deliberate conduct by governmental entities, not merely negligence, as torts and
constitutional violations are separate considerations).
178. Philips, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39753 at *79 (citing Avery, 847 F.3d at
441).
179. Philips, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39753 at *79.
180. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794 (“Coercing witnesses to speak . . . is a genuine
constitutional wrong, but the persons aggrieved would be [the witnesses] rather
than [a party to the suit]”).
181. Taylor, 80 F. Supp. 817 at 826.
182. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907 *32-33 (W.D. Tex. 2020).
183. Id. at *32.
184. Id. at *33.
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difference between coerced testimony and fabricated evidence.185
Instead, the court noted that there were allegations that the officers
knew the testimony was false.186 Thus, the court held that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.187
In McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, the plaintiffs alleged that
defendants engaged in coercion of witnesses and fabrication of false
testimony by making promises to putative witnesses that criminal
charges would be dismissed or reduced, as well as well as by
coaching and altering witness statements.188 The court first held
that the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity as to
the allegations.189 Additionally, the prosecutors were entitled to
absolute immunity for claims that prosecutors fabricated and
coerced evidence via jailhouse informants.190 Lastly, the court found
that the prosecutors were necessarily acting in an investigatory
capacity.191
At least one other jurisdiction appears willing to consider
whether coerced testimony should be treated differently from
fabrication of evidence claims. In Watkins v. Healy, a district court
case from the Sixth Circuit, a prosecutor argued that the plaintiff’s
fabrication of evidence claim failed because the plaintiff did not
allege that the prosecutor fabricated a witness’’ statement.192 The
prosecutor claimed that the plaintiff alleged the prosecutor was
confronted with two different versions of events, one implicating the
plaintiff and the other not, and concluded that the version
implicating the plaintiff was true.193 The prosecutor argued that
such conduct was “coercion” and not fabrication, citing decisions
from the Seventh Circuit.194 The court disagreed, finding that the
plaintiff did allege that the prosecutor fabricated a false
statement.195 Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff alleged
that the prosecutor forced the witness to implicate the defendant
after the witness had recanted and labeled as “not true” an earlier
statement accusing the plaintiff of killing the victim, and that the
witness told the prosecutor that the plaintiff had nothing to do with
the murder.196 The court held such allegations were sufficient to
support that the prosecutor knew or should have known that the
witness’ statement implicating the plaintiff was false, which was
185. See id. at *9 (holding that the plaintiff alleged a viable claim under §
1983 as all of the officers knew the confession was false and used it anyway).
186. Id.
187. Id. at *34.
188. 475 F. Supp. 2d 862, 894-95 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
189. Id. at 895.
190. Id. at 897.
191. Id.
192. Watkins, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134950, at *35.
193. Id. at *36.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *36-7.
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sufficient to support that the plaintiff alleged fabrication of
evidence.197
Watkins, on its face, infers that courts may consider whether
there is a distinction between fabricated evidence and coerced
testimony. However, the court did not actually analyze the issue.
Rather, the court held that while the prosecutor “may enjoy
absolute immunity for introducing allegedly-false testimony [by the
witness] at trial does not somehow retroactively immunize [the
prosecutor’s] fabrication of [the witness’s] statement long before
trial and prior to the commencement of the judicial process.198
Watkins supports that some other jurisdictions may begin to
recognize that distinction expressly recognized by the Seventh
Circuit. However, most jurisdictions fail to analyze whether coerced
testimony is different and distinct from the fabricated evidence. The
courts that do not consider a distinction between coerced testimony
and fabricated evidence essentially gloss over the potential issue.
As described, supra, the courts that do not find a distinction simply
combine the analysis without exploring the specific potential issues.

IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DISTINGUISHES
BETWEEN COERCED TESTIMONY AND FABRICATION OF
EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY AS THE ANALYSIS FALLS IN LINE
WITH ESTABLISHED LEGAL CONCEPTS
Most jurisdictions do not recognize a distinction between
coerced testimony and fabricated evidence. Yet, the Seventh
Circuit’s recognition of this distinction is the better policy.
Specifically, coerced testimony, as opposed to fabricated evidence,
may be true, as the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognizes.
Accordingly, because there is not an inherent constitutional
deprivation in such claims, there is no policy reason to permit a §
1983 claim premised on testimony the officer or prosecutor did not
know was false.199 This is precisely why coerced testimony should
and must be distinguished from situations in which an officer or
prosecutor knows or reasonably should know that testimony is
fabricated. Furthermore, without direct knowledge or the
reasonable expectation of knowing testimony was mendacious, a
then-defendant turned civil plaintiff lacks standing to raise a § 1983
suit as the purported wrong was committed against the witness, not

197. Id. at *37.
198. Id. *42 (citing Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1000 (6th Cir. 1999)
(“The simple fact that acts may ultimately lead to witness testimony does not
serve to cloak these actions with absolute testimonial immunity”).
199. Redd v. Dougherty, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1054 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(dismissing witness’s § 1983 witness coercion claim and noting that the plaintiff
“has not cited, nor has the Court’s research revealed, any cases recognizing the
viability of a coercive-questioning claim”).
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the individual on trial.200
This is further based on the fact that due process claims
historically apply to deliberate decisions of government officials to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.201 In Daniels, the
United States Supreme Court considered whether negligent
conduct was sufficient to support a constitutional deprivation under
the Fourteenth Amendment and rejected this notion.202 “Where a
government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property
is merely negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is
constitutionally required.’”203 Moreover, “[t]hat injuries inflicted by
governmental negligence are not addressed by the United States
Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal
concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests.”204
Accordingly, the Daniels Court recognized that states could enact
tort claim statutes as a redress for such injuries, but that the United
States Constitution does not address the same concerns as
traditional tort law.205
To be clear, the distinction between coerced testimony and
fabricated evidence should be relatively thin. When there is
evidence that the police and/or prosecutors knew or reasonably
should have known that testimony is false, courts properly
recognize that there is a valid § 1983 claim. However, simply
because there are situations in which coerced testimony may
overlap with fabricated evidence sufficient to support a
constitutional deprivation, does not reduce the distinction between
the two types of conduct to irrelevancy. Rather, the better approach
for courts to take is to analyze and determine whether there is a
valid claim to support that the police and/or prosecutors engaged in
fabrication of evidence, i.e., when a cognizable claim exists, or
whether coercion of witness testimony existed such that there is not
a valid § 1983 claim.
This solution is further supported by the relevant concept of
standing. A criminal defendant does not suffer a constitutional
deprivation when police and/or prosecutors engage in coercive
conduct towards another person.206 That is, a party may only seek
redress for injuries done to him or her, but not for injuries to

200. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794.
201. Buraker, 3dd F. Supp. 2d at 707 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331).
202. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
203. Id. at 333 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Phillips, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39753 at *77 (quoting Petty, 754
F3d at 422) (“[P]olice officers’ nondisclosure of coercive acts used to obtain
incriminating evidence from people other than the plaintiff sounds in malicious
prosecution rather than due process,” the court concluded, “since the officers’
coercive conduct ‘may have violated the witness's rights, but it did not violate
the arrestee's due process rights.’”).
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others.207 Accordingly, when the police and/or prosecutors engage in
conduct that includes coercing testimony from a separate witness,
there is no injury to the criminal defendant, and a plaintiff cannot
establish a right to relief under § 1983.208 Thus, the injury cannot
arise unless, and until, it specifically affects the criminal defendant.
However, if the police and/or prosecutors do not know that the
testimony is false or do not have reason to know that the testimony
is false, then there is no injury to the criminal defendant as well.
Thus, the more sound approach is to recognize that coercive conduct
is not a cognizable claim through which the criminal defendant can
pursue a § 1983 claim. The basic concepts of standing support the
Seventh Circuit’s approach to distinguishing the difference between
coerced testimony and fabricated evidence.209
As a final clarification, this recommended approach does not
implicate a defendant’s own coerced confessions. Obviously, a
defendant that is coerced into providing a false confession has
standing to assert constitutional deprivations.210 But a criminal
defendant who faces testimony from a witness who was coerced into
testifying is separate and distinct. That witness’s constitutional
deprivation cannot, and should not, become the defendant’s
constitutional deprivation. Constitutional rights do not flow from
one party to another, but rather are specific to the individual.211 As
such, any improper coercive tactics used against a witness do not
flow to the criminal defendant. Rather, the proper question is
whether the conduct could possibly violate the criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights. Absent a showing that police or the
prosecution knew or reasonably should have known that the
testimony was false, there is no constitutional deprivation against
the criminal defendant. Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s distinction

207. Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 166; see also Allee, 416 U.S. at 82829 (holding that a person cannot “acquire standing to sue by bringing his action
on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them
standing had they been named plaintiffs; its bears repeating that a person
cannot predicate standing on injury which he does not share . . .” and a person
may not get standing via a backdoor in the context of a class action).
208. See Collins v. W. Hartford Police Dep’t, 324 F. App’x 137, 139 (2d Cir.
2009) (concluding that the plaintiff could not establish a right to relief under §
1983 because he lacked standing as he failed to allege a cognizable deprivation
of his liberty or property and had no standing to challenge constitutional
deprivations alleged to have been experienced by his mother).
209. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (holding that injury in
fact, the first and foremost of standing’s three elements).
210. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964). It is now axiomatic that a
defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is
founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for
the truth or falsity of the confession. Id.
211. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact -- an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized”).
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between coerced testimony and fabricated evidence falls in line with
established constitutional jurisprudence. The circuits that do not
distinguish between coerced testimony and fabricated evidence
improperly blur the lines between these exogenous concepts thereby
entangling them in constitutional quandaries not specific to each.

V. CONCLUSION
While fabrication of evidence requires some constitutional
deprivation, coerced testimony does not necessarily. The crucial
distinction between coerced testimony and fabrication of evidence is
how such evidence may be used against a criminal defendant. As
the Seventh Circuit recognizes, coerced testimony of a third-party
witness is not necessarily false.212 With the answer to this question
remaining unknown at the time of the trial, how can the use of such
testimony be a constitutional deprivation of the criminal defendant
when the prosecutor or police officer does not know it may unfairly
deprive the defendant of his or her liberty? Rather, it is unclear
whether the use of such evidence unfairly deprives a person of his
or her liberty. Thus, there is a crucial distinction between fabricated
evidence and coerced testimony, and the Seventh Circuit’s
jurisprudence accurately reflects just that.
To be clear: allegations of police misconduct are important and
should not be trivialized. The United States Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that the United States Constitution does not
address the same concerns that torts may, and that negligence
cannot support a due process violation. And while public policy
should not favor coercion as a proper interrogation technique, the
party who actually suffers from coercion is the party being coerced.
Simply because coercion is a societal ill does not necessarily mean
that said conduct is always a constitutional deprivation. As such,
the Seventh Circuit’s approach adequately balances the
constitutional analysis with concepts of standing and state tort laws
such that it’s the premiere methodology other jurisdictions should
adopt by separating coerced testimony from fabricated evidence and
testimony in§1983 claims.

212. Harvey v. City of Chicago, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184293, *10-11
(“[Plaintiff] has not provided, and the Court has not found, any authority
establishing that [Plaintiff], as a coerced witness, may bring such a § 1983
claim”).

